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A LOOK AT INDIANA CODE 34-1-14-5:
INDIANA'S PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
K. RICHARD OLSON*
INTRODUCTION
The basic purpose of the physician-patient privilege is to foster
the free and uninhibited exchange of information between the doc-
tor and his patient,' thus allowing the physician to make the most
informed decision for the treatment of his fiatient. Despite the ad-
mirable intention of the privilege, it has been severely criticized by
legal scholars.2 Wigmore attacked the privilege by declaring that
only in a very few cases is the matter communicated to the physi-
cian confidential; and, even if it is confidential, the absence of the
privilege would not inhibit the patient from fully confiding in the
doctor. While agreeing that the relationship between the physician
and his patient should be fostered, Wigmore emphatically denied
that the injury to that relationship which would result from abolish-
ing the privilege is greater than the injury to justice which occurs
due to the existence of the privilege.3
At the common law the physician-patient privilege did not
exist.' It was never incorporated into English law,5 and in the United
States twelve jurisdictions have never adopted it.6 A comparison of
recent state and federal approaches to the physician-patient privi-
lege7 indicates that the privilege's present scope remains unsettled.
* Senior writer.
1. Note, Evidence-Physician-Patient Privilege- Compelling Disclosure of Privileged
Information-Discretion of the Trial Judge, 41 N.C.L. REv. 627, 628 (1963).
2. 8 1. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 2380 (McNaughton ed. 1961); C. MCCOR-
MICK. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 105 (Cleary ed. 1972).
3. 8 .J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, at 829-30.
4. Collins v. Blair, 256 Ind. 230, 268 N.E.2d 95 (1971); Towles v. McCurdy, 163 Ind.
12, 71 N.E. 129 (1904).
5. Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Professions and the Law of Privileged Com-
munications, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 609, 611 (1964).
6. Comment, Evidence: The Physician-Patient Privilege: Alternatives to the Rule as it
Now Exists in Oklahoma, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 380, 383 (1971). The states which have failed to
adopt the rule are: Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Vermont.
7. Compare PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES
Dismicr CoUrs AND MAGISTRATES, rule 504, 46 F.R.D. 161, 257-62 (1969) (Rule 504 allows
confidential communications to be privileged only between psychotherapists and their pa-
tients) with WISCONSIN RULES OF EVIDENCE, rule 805.04 in 46 Wis. BAR BULL. 57, 63 (1973)
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The privilege has been established by statute in Indiana for some
time,' and it has been the subject of much comment and criticism
by the Indiana courts.' The present statute reads:
The following persons shall not be competent as wit-
nesses:
Fourth. Physicians, as to matters communicated to
them, as such, by patients, in the course of their profes-
sional business, or advice given in such cases. 10
Most of the litigation concerning the Indiana statute has cen-
tered around the following questions: the meaning of the word "phy-
sician"; the meaning of the terms "matters communicated" and
"professional business" and the relationship of these terms to each
other; the effect of a third person's presence during communications
between the physician and patient; the question of waiver while the
patient is still alive; and waiver of the privilege after the patient's
death. What follows is a general analysis of the physician-patient
statutory privilege in Indiana. The Indiana cases concerning the
privilege will be discussed with reference to the five areas specified
above, with the goal of determining the present status of the privi-
lege and its possible future in Indiana.
INTERPRETING THE STATUTE
Overview
Generally, the Indiana courts have been asked to resolve ques-
tions concerning the physician-patient privilege in the following
types of actions: personal injury cases," cases involving the pay-
(Rule 805.04 allows for the general physician-patient privilege with some exceptions).
8. The first statute to confer a privilege was passed in 1861. It read: "[Pihysicians as
to any matters confided to them in the course of the duties of their profession . . . shall
not, . . . be competent witnesses, unless with the consent of the party making such confiden-
tial communications .... " ch. 27, § 3 (1861) Ind. Laws Regular Session 41. The current
law was passed in 1881. ch. 38, § 275 (1881) Ind. Laws (Special session).
9. See notes 11 to 17 infra and accompanying text.
10. IND. CODE 34-1-14-5 (1971).
11. Collins v. Blair, 256 Ind. 230, 268 N.E.2d 95 (1971) (personal injuries sustained in
auto accident); Acme-Evans Co. v. Schnepf, 214 Ind. 394, 14 N.E.2d 561 (1938) (injuries
resulting from negligent operation of a truck); Schlarb v. Henderson, 211 Ind. 1, 4 N.E.2d
205 (1936) (injuries sustained from automobile collision); Chicago, S.B. & L.S.R. Co. v.
Walas, 192 Ind. 369, 135 N.E. 150 (1922) (injuries sustained by passenger because allegedly
pushed off train by conductor); Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. Gross, 186 Ind. 471, 114 N.E.
[Vol. 8Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 [1973], Art. 2
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ment of insurance proceeds,'" criminal cases, 3 contested will cases,"
962 (1917) (brakeman sued for injuries sustained while on the job); New York, C. & St. Louis
R. Co. v. Shields, 185 Ind. 704, 112 N.E. 762 (1916) (injuries sustained due to company
moving its cars); William Laurie Co. v. McCullough, 174 Ind. 477, 90 N.E. 1014 (1910)
(injuries sustained from falling on slippery floor); Pittsburgh C. C. & St. Louis Ry. Co. v.
O'Conner, 171 Ind. 686, 85 N.E. 969 (1908) (injuries sustained when struck by passenger
train); Springer v. Byram, 137 Ind. 15, 36 N.E. 361 (1894) (injury sustained while in public
elevator); Williams v. Johnson, 112 Ind. 273, 13 N.E. 872 (1887); Shaneff v. Sabo, 143 Ind.
App. 1, 237 N.E.2d 277 (1968) (injuries sustained in automobile collision); Boger v. Krinn,
141 Ind. App. 418, 228 N.E.2d 788 (1940) (injuries due to collision of ambulance with automo-
bile); Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. McClure, 108 Ind. App. 253, 24 N.E.2d 788
(194)) (injuries sustained from carbon monoxide poisoning allegedly due to gas leak); State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Kramer, 105 Ind. App. 591, 14 N.E.2d 741 (1938)
(action alleging fraudulent conduct in securing signed release of person who sustained per-
sonal injuries in a truck collision); General Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Co. v. Tibbs,
102 Ind. App. 262, 2 N.E.2d 229 (1936) (suit by passenger in car that was struck by a truck);
Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Co. v. Vaughn, 88 Ind. App. 35, 163 N.E. 107 (1928)
(husband sued for loss of wife's services after she was struck by automobile); Grossnickle v.
Avery, 96 Ind. App. 479, 152 N.E. 288 (1926) (injuries sustained in bicycle-automobile
collision); City of Princeton v. Fields, 72 Ind. App. 278, 125 N.E. 653 (1920) (injuries due to
defective sidewalk); Capital Rattan Co. v. Francher, 64 Ind. App. 685, 116 N.E. 593 (1917)
(injuries sustained in factory elevator); Chicago, E. & E. R. Co. v. Schenkel, 57 Ind. App.
175, 104 N.E. 50 (1914) (switchman injured on the job); Mortimer v. Daub, 52 Ind. App. 30,
98 N.E. 845 (1912) (injuries sustained from negligent operation of interurban car); Rump v.
Woods, 510 Ind. App. 347, 98 N.E. 369 (1912) (injuries sustained from automobile collision);
Chicago, I & L Ry. Co. v. Gorman, 47 Ind. App. 432, 94 N.E. 730 (1911), aff'd on other
grounds, 58 Ind. App. 381, 106 N.E. 897 (1912) (injuries sustained from collision with train
when plaintiff was passing over tracks of defendant in a wagon); Indiana Union Traction Co.
v. Thomas, 44 Ind. App. 468, 88 N.E. 356 (1909) (suit for personal injuries sustained when
plaintiff was alighting from a car operated by defendant); City of Warsaw v. Fisher, 24 Ind.
App. 46, 55 N.E. 42 (1899) (personal injuries sustained due to defective sidewalk); New York,
Central & St. Louis R. Co. v. Mushrush, 11 Ind. App. 192, 37 N.E. 954 (1894) (father sued
for death of his minor son who was run over by train).
12. Insurance company refused to pay value of life insurance policy claiming the de-
ceased fraudulently misrepresented himself on the application for insurance in the following
cases: Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 214 Ind. 134, 14 N.E.2d 911
(1938); Houghton v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. of Hartford, 165 Ind. 32, 73 N.E. 592 (1905);
Aetna Insurance Co. v. Deming, 123 Ind. 384, 24 N.E. 86 (1890); Penn Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Wiler, 100 Ind. 92 (1885); Excelsior Mutual Aid Association of Anderson, Indiana v.
Riddle, 91 Ind. 84 (1883); Masonic Mutual Benefit Association v. Beck, 77 Ind. 208 (1881);
Mathews v. Rex Health and Accident Insurance Co., 86 Ind. App. 335, 157 N.E. 467 (1927);
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Head, 86 Ind. App. 326, 157 N.E. 448 (1927); Traveler's
Insurance Co. v. Fletcher American National Bank, 84 Ind. App. 563, 150 N.E. 825 (1926).
Further cases that have dealt with the privilege in life insurance cases are: North American
Union v. Oleske, 64 Ind. App. 435, 116 N.E. 68 (1917) (company claimed decedent committed
suicide); Mason's Union Life Insurance Association v. Brockman, 26 Ind. App. 182, 59 N.E.
401 (1961) (company claimed deceased violated conditions of application after the policy was
issued).
13. Green v. State, - Ind. __ , 274 N.E.2d 267 (1971) (first degree murder); Sum-
merlin v. State, 256 Ind. 652, 271 N.E.2d 411 (1971) (assault and battery with intent to kill);
Doss v. State, 256 Ind. 174, 267 N.E.2d 385 (1971) (second degree burglary); Alder v. State,
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suits to enforce oral contracts,' 5 medical malpractice suits"5 and ac-
tions to set aside conveyances of land. 7 In these cases the courts
have struggled with the problem of protecting the physician-patient
relationship while, at the same time, trying to allow for the fullest
disclosure of relevant facts necessary for proper adjudication. Con-
ceivably, the Indiana statute could silence the physician as to rele-
vant matters. The Indiana rule states that a physician "shall not be
competent" to testify. If a court were to construe this provision as
an absolute prohibition against a doctor's testimony concerning his
patient, the statute would often prevent the discovery of necessary
information even though the patient had no objections to the discov-
ery. Thus, realizing the possible injustices of a strict interpretation,
the Indiana Supreme Court in Penn Mutual Life Insurance Com-
pany v. Wiler5 stated:
The purpose of the statute is not the suppression of
truth needed for reaching the correct results in litigating
though this may sometimes incidentally occur. . . but the
239 Ind. 68, 154 N.E.2d 716 (1958) (reckless homicide); Myers v. State, 192 Ind. 592, 137 N.E.
547 (1922) (defendant convicted of manslaughter); Seifert v. State, 160 Ind. 464, 67 N.E. 100
(1903) (crime of producing an abortion); Hauk v. State, 148 Ind. 238, 46 N.E. 127 (1897)
(crime of producing an abortion); Robertson v. State, - Ind. App. -, 291 N.E.2d 708
(1973) (driving an automobile while intoxicated); Post v. State, 14 Ind. App. 452, 42 N.E.
1120 (1896) (prosecution for bastardy).
14. Cases where it was claimed the will was invalid due to mental incompetency, undue
influence or fraud: McCord v. Strader, 82 N.E.2d 893 (Ind. 1948), aff'd on other grounds, 227
Ind. 389, 86 N.E.2d 441 (1949); Pence v. Myers, 180 Ind. 282, 101 N.E. 716 (1913); Heaston
v. King, 167 Ind. 101, 77 N.E. 805 (1906); Brackney v. Fogle, 156 Ind. 535, 60 N.E. 303 (1901);
Bower v. Bower, 142 Ind. 192, 41 N.E. 523 (1895); Gurley v. Park, 135 Ind. 440, 35 N.E. 279
(1893); Morris v. Morris, 119 Ind. 341, 21 N.E. 918 (1889); Heustan v. Simpson, 115 Ind. 62,
17 N.E. 261 (1888); Vaughn v. Martin, 145 Ind. App. 455, 251 N.E.2d 444 (1969); Sager v.
Moltz, 80 Ind. App. 122, 139 N.E. 687 (1923).
15. In re Beck's Estate, 143 Ind. App. 291, 240 N.E.2d 88 (1968) (action for services
rendered the deceased); Hauch v. Fritch, 99 Ind. App. 65, 189 N.E. 639 (1934) (action for
services rendered deceased over six year period); Minnis v. Steele, 79 Ind. App. 45, 132 N.E.
702 (1921) (action for services rendered as caretaker of decedent's home); Hays v. Hays, 49
Ind. App. 298, 97 N.E. 198 (1912) (action on quantum meruit for services rendered for manag-
ing a store); Miller v. Miller, 47 Ind. App. 239, 94 N.E. 243 (1911) (personal attendant of
deceased sued for services rendered).
16. Aspy v. Botkins, 160 Ind. 170, 66 N.E. 462 (1902) (negligent treatment of right
knee); Lane v. Boicourt, 128 Ind. 420, 27 N.E. 1111 (1891) (negligent treatment of woman
during and after childbirth); Beckwell v. Hosler, 10 Ind. App. 5, 37 N.E. 580 (1894) (negligent
setting and treatment of disclocated hip).
17. Cases involving fraud and undue influence claimed in securing the transfer: Stayner
v. Nye, 227 Ind. 231, 85 N.E.2d 496 (1949); Baker v. Whittaker, 33 Ind. App. 347, 182 N.E.2d
442 (1962); Studabaker v. Faylor, 52 Ind. App. 171, 98 N.E. 318 (1912).
18. 100 Ind. 92 (1885).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 [1973], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol8/iss1/2
PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
purpose is the promulgation and protection of confidence of
a certain kind, the inviolability of which is deemed to be of
more importance than the results sought through compul-
sory disclosure in a court of justice. Notwithstanding the
absolute prohibitory form of our present statute, we think
it confers a privilege which the patient, for whose benefit
the provision is made, may claim or waive. It gives no right
to the physician to testify, and creates no absolute incom-
petency. To hold otherwise would result in many cases in
obstructing justice without subserving the purpose of the
statute."
The Indiana court obviously felt that a competency statute would
be too suppressive; therefore, the statute was transformed into a
privilege statute. As such, the privilege's protection could be waived
or claimed only by the patient; the physician was given no control
over the assertion of the privilege. Although these interpretations
are clearly contrary to the literal meaning of the statute, they are
still controlling, since the legislature has not seen fit to correct these
inconsistent judicial constructions. '
A general observation of the cases which have dealt with the
privilege indicates that initially the courts expanded the concept of
privilege, because to be effective the privilege had to protect not
only matters orally communicated to the physician but also all in-
formation acquired through observation of the patient." Subse-
quent cases, however, were concerned with limiting the statute."
Language typical of these later cases is found in Stayner v. Nye,23
an action to set aside a deed because it was procured through fraud
and undue influence. In Stayner the Supreme Court of Indiana
declared that since the physician-patient privilege often prohibits
the ascertainment of truth,' 4 the rule of construction that statutes
19. Id. at 100-1.
20. Note, Testimonial Privilege and Competency in Indiana, 27 IND. L.J. 256, 259
(1952).
21. See generally Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. Gross, 186 Ind. 471, 114 N.E. 962 (1917);
Masonic Mutual Benefit Association v. Beck, 77 Ind. 203 (1881); Hays v. Hays, 79 Ind. App.
298, 97 N.E. 198 (1912).
22. See generally Collins v. Blair, 256 Ind. 230, 268 N.E.2d 95 (1971); Alder v. State,
239 Ind. 68, 157 N.E.2d 716 (1958); Stayner v. Nye, 227 Ind. 231, 85 N.E.2d 446 (1949); Myers
v. State, 192 Ind. 592, 137 N.E. 547 (1922); General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Co. v.
Tibbs,102 Ind. App. 262, 2 N.E.2d 229 (1936).
23. 227 Ind. 231, 85 N.E.2d 446 (1949).
24. Id. at 238, 85 N.E.2d at 449.
19731
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in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed should
be followed in privilege cases. 5 Therefore, the statute's prohibitions
were not to be extended by implication." Although one commenta-
tor declared that the Indiana courts have not sufficiently limited the
privilege, 7 a closer look at the results of Indiana's judicial interpre-
tation will lend itself to a more exacting criticism.
Meaning of "Physician"
The word "physician" appears in the statute, and questions
concerning the scope of the term have arisen. In William Laurie Co.
v. McCullough,2" a slip-and-fall personal injury case, the plaintiff
invoked the privilege in an attempt to keep her gymnastic instructor
from testifying as to the plaintiff's physical condition. The Indiana
Supreme Court held that, for the purpose of the statute, "physi-
cian" describes a person who has received the degree of doctor of
medicine from an incorporated institution, and who is lawfully li-
censed to engage in the practice of medicine.29 Obviously, the gym
instructor did not qualify under this definition, and the privilege
was not applied to silence him.
Indiana courts have applied the above definition in a number
of situations. To illustrate, it has been held that a chiropractor falls
within the standard. 0 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, in applying Indiana law, held that a psychologist did not
satisfy the Indiana requirements for inclusion under the privilege
statute.:" This decision seems correct. A psychologist does not have
the type of training that even a chiropractor is required to obtain.32
Several writers have argued for a broad psychotherapist-patient
privilege, :  and the Indiana legislature has provided for a limited
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Note, supra note 20, at 267.
28. 174 Ind. 477, 90 N.E. 1014 (1910).
29. Id. at 488, 90 N.E. at 1018.
30. Collins v. Blair, 256 Ind. 230, 268 N.E.2d 95 (1971).
31. Elliott v, Watkins Trucking Co., 406 F.2d 90 (7th Cir. 1969).
32. See IND. CoDE 25-33-1-5 (1971) (statutory requirements for basic certification of a
psychologist), also IND. CODE 25-10-1-2 (1973) (requirements in order to practice as a chiro-
practor).
33. See generally Fisher, The Psychotheraputic Professions and the Law of Privileged
Communications, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 609 (1964); and Comment, Privileged Communications
Between Psychiatrist and Patient, 28 IND. L.J. 32 (1952).
One commentator has put the particular need for confidentiality for the psychotherapist
[Vol. 8
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psychologist-client privilege.3 4 There is merit in the argument for a
broad privilege for psychotherapuetic relationships, because a psy-
chotherapist's effectiveness depends completely upon the patient's
willingness to talk and reveal very personal information.35 The pro-
posed Federal Rules of Evidence have expressly recognized the im-
portance of keeping matters communicated between psychotherap-
ist and patient confidential." Of all those in the medical field, the
psychotherapist has the strongest arguments for demanding a broad
privilege. Although this is an interesting area, other sections of the
statute have received more attention by the Indiana courts.
as follows:
The privilege which exists for the protection of confidential communications
made by a patient to a physician has been criticized on many grounds. One of the
most popular criticisms has been that communications made to physicians are rarely
of a confidential nature, that only in quite unusual instances would the content of
such communications be the subject of second thoughts, let alone controversy. In
contrast to those communications common to the physician-patient relationship,
those made by a client-patient to a psychotherapist are of an extremely confidential
character. The patient that hesitates to consult the therapist because knowledge of
this consultation by other persons will cause an inference by those persons that the
patient has need for divulging confidences which, if widely known, would be humili-
ating to the patient. It can be nothing but embarrassing to reveal one's deepest
emotions, unfulfilled wishes, frustrations, fantasies, etc. In fact, a troubled person
will often be impelled to see a psychotherapist because the nature of the declarations
which he feels required to make to someone are such as cannot be revealed to anyone
else, and especially not to one's intimates. Thus, almost by definition, and in prac-
tice, the psychotherapeutic relationship is not only one in which one is required to
feel free to discuss those matters which usually would not be discussed under any
other circumstances, but usually depends for its success upon the creation of an
at mosphere in which embarrassing facts will be freed from conscious and unconscious
censorship. This is quite different from the physician-patient relationship. [footnotes
omittedl
Fisher, supra at 620-21.
:34. IND. CODE 25-33-1-17 (1971), reads as follows:
No psychologist certified under provisions of this act (25-33-1-1-25-33-1-11)
shall disclose any information he may have acquired from persons with whom he has
dealt in his professional capacity, except under the following circumstances: (1) in
trials for homocide when the disclosure relates directly to the facts or immediate
circumstances of said homocide; (2) in proceedings the purposes of which is to deter-
emine mental competency, or in which a defense of mental incompetency is raised;
(3) in actions, civil or criminal, against a psychologist for malpractice; (4) upon an
issue as to validity of a document as a will of a client; and (5) with the express consent
of the client or subject, or in the case of his death or disability of his legal representa-
tive.
35. PRELIMINARY DRAF-r OF PROPOSED RuLES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRIcT
CouRTS AND MAGISTRATFS, 46 F.R.D. 161, 260 (1969).
36. Id. at 260.
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"Matters Communicated" and "Professional Business"
Under the statute, matters communicated to the physician in
the course of his professional business are protected. In Alder v.
State7 the Indiana Supreme Court defined the phrase "matters
communicated" to include:
information obtained in the sick room, heard or observed by
the physician, or of which he is otherwise informed pertain-
ing to the patient and upon which he is persuaded to do
some act or give some direction or advice in the discharge
of his professional obligation .3
An important question raised by this definition is the meaning of
"professional obligation or business." In Vaughn v. Martin" the
Indiana Court of Appeals defined "professional business" to include
''any contact between a doctor and a person-a patient-in the
course of which the doctor is required to make some evaluation,
perform such duty, or do some act based upon his medical expertise
which is to benefit the patient."4 ° The Vaughn case dealt with an
action to invalidate a will; the claimant alleged that the testator was
mentally incompetent to make the will. At the trial a physician was
allowed to testify as to the decedent-testator's mental and physical
condition. Because the decedent had adhered to the Christian Sci-
entist faith, he had consulted the doctor only once in 25 years. The
sole purpose for the consultation was to allow the decedent to obtain
the physician's permission to enter a nursing home. The court held
that it was error to allow the doctor to testify, because the knowl-
edge was obtained by the physician in the course of his professional
business. The doctor had to evaluate the patient's qualifications to
enter the nursing home, and he had to use his medical expertise to
do so. The fact that the patient had visited a doctor only once in 25
years did not make the physician's evaluation any less professional.
The definition's applicability was to be determined on a qualitative
basis rather than on a quantitative basis I.4
37. 239 Ind. 68, 154 N.E.2d 716 (1958). This case concerns the testimony of a doctor as
to the contents of a blood sample taken from an unconscious patient; the information was
held privileged as a matter communicated between the physician and his patient.
38. Id. at 76, 154 N.E.2d at 720.
39. 145 Ind. App. 455, 251 N.E.2d 444 (1969).
40. Id. at 462, 251 N.E.2d at 448.
41. Id.
[Vol. 8Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 [1973], Art. 2
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"Matters communicated" and "professional business" are im-
portant concepts in understanding the statute, and they must be
read and considered together in order to comprehend their true
value. Several cases point this out. For example, in Bower v. Bower42
an action was brought to set aside the will of one Andrew Bower.
The testator's doctor was allowed to testify as to the mental and
physical condition of the decedent through reference to knowledge
obtained by the doctor when he encountered the decedent on the
road one day. During that encounter, the doctor talked with the
deceased about collecting a bill which the deceased owed to him.
The Indiana Supreme Court admitted the evidence because the
facts and knowledge were acquired after the existence of the profes-
sional relationship had ended, and thus the knowledge gained was
not privileged."
Even where the physician-patient relationship still exists, cer-
tain knowledge may not be protected by the privilege. The case of
Myers v. State44 involved a defendant-patient who was convicted of
manslaughter. While leaving the examining room, the treating phy-
sician heard his patient utter a threatening statement. The Indiana
Supreme Court held that under these facts the words uttered by the
patient were not necessary for treatment nor were they intended to
be heard by the doctor. Therefore, this knowledge fell outside of the
privilege.15
An outcome similar to that of the Myers case is found in Miller
v. Miller,4" in which an attendant of the decedent-patient sued the
estate for services rendered. At the trial the physician testified that
on one of his professional visits to the decedent's home he was told
by the decedent that plaintiff was to be paid for her services. The
administrator of the estate objected to the doctor's testimony on the
grounds that the information was privileged. The court of appeals
disagreed, reasoning that even though the professional relationship
was still in existence, this statement was not connected in any man-
ner with the examination of the patient, a conversation about her
ailments, the physician's employment or the care and attention the
42. 142 Ind. 194, 41 N.E. 523 (1895).
43. Id. at 201, 41 N.E. at 525.
44. 192 Ind. 592, 137 N.E. 547 (1922).
45. Id. at 601, 137 N.E. at 550.
46. 47 Ind. App. 239, 94 N.E. 243 (1911).
1973]
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patient should receive. 7 In short, the matters communicated had no
reasonable connection with the physician's professional business,
since the type of medical treatment or advice he gave did not de-
pend upon the patient's personal attendant being paid.
Even though the information which is communicated may seem
to have little relationship to medical treatment, such information
may be necessary for the physician to discharge his professional
obligation. An example is Hays v. Hays,4" in which information
concerning the patient's income was held to be within the privilege.
In Hays the patient's income was discussed in order that the doctor
could determine whether or not his patient could take a trip to
improve her health. It might be argued that protecting such infor-
mation places the physician in the unusual position of a financial
advisor, an area obviously outside the physician's usual field of
expertise. However, the knowledge did seem necessary to suggest
the type of care the patient should receive, especially since the trip
might financially overburden the patient, thus counteracting any
medical value the trip would otherwise provide. For example, if the
purpose of the trip were to allow the patient to relax and recuperate,
such a purpose might be hindered if the patient were being driven
further into debt with each passing day. Thus, although it might
appear that one's income is irrelevant for the purposes of medical
treatment, under certain situations the physician may require such
information to discharge his professional obligation properly. How-
ever, it is clear that not all communications are necessary for medi-
cal treatment, and in such instances the information should be ex-
cluded from the privilege's protection. It would be absurd, therefore,
to view the matters communicated in the abstract; the physician's
need for that information must be considered in light of the particu-
lar facts presented.
Difficulties with the concepts of "matters communicated" and
"professional business" can also arise after the patient's death. For
example, the states disagree as to whether or not information ac-
47. Id. at 247, 94 N.E. at 246. See also Minnis v. Steele, 79 Ind. App. 45, 132 N.E. 702
(1921), where there was an action against the patient's estate for services rendered; the court
allowed decedent's physician to testify as to communications with deceased wherein she
stated she wanted plaintiff to be well paid for her services rendered. The court held that these
matters were not reasonably within the physician's professional business or facts about which
he was expected to give advice.
48. 49 Ind. App. 298, 97 N.E. 198 (1912).
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quired by a physician as a result of an autopsy on a former patient
should be privileged.' The only Indiana case that has considered
this question is Mathews v. Rex Health and Accident Insurance
Company,"' in which the Indiana Court of Appeals held such infor-
mation to be privileged. In light of the facts in the Mathews case,
the appellate court's decision seems questionable. Not only was the
autopsy performed by a physician who had no previous dealings
with the decedent, but the doctor had never even met the patient
while the latter was alive. The doctor's only duties at the hospital
were to act as director of the laboratories and to serve as pathologist.
The court created the fiction that the pathologist was an assistant
to the treating physician, and the privilege was, therefore, extended
to cover the pathologist. Since the treating physician would not
have been allowed to disclose his findings had he performed the
autopsy, the court reasoned that it could not allow the privilege to
be circumvented by another doctor performing the same proce-
dure."'
It is difficult to see what purpose is served by excluding the
pathologist's knowledge. The only relationship he had with the pa-
tient occurred after the patient's death. The basic concern of the
privilege, free disclosure between the physician and his patient,
seems valueless here, since the patient's full and uninhibited coop-
eration is no longer needed. Arguably, there may be some justifica-
tion in enjoining the treating physician from disclosing what he
discovered during the autopsy, because his knowledge may be
tainted by what the patient had previously told him. Nevertheless,
the reasoning is strained when the basic purpose of the privilege is
considered. Surely very few patients would ever allow concern over
postmortem disclosures to inhibit their communications with a doc-
tor. Thus, it is clear that the pathologist in Mathews could have
testified without defeating the purpose of the statutory privilege.
Presence of Third Persons
The statute only concerns itself with the physician and his
patient. Therefore, it is not surprising that, although the immediate
physician-client privilege remains intact," third persons are not
49. Tortella, Physician-Patient Privileged Communications, 9 TRIAL 59, 60 (1973).
50. 86 Ind. App. 335, 157 N.E. 467 (1927).
51. Id. at 348, 157 N.E. at 471.
52. Indiana Union Traction Corp. v. Thomas, 44 Ind. App. 468, 88 N.E. 356 (1909).
1973] Olson: A Look at Indiana Code 34-1-14-5: Indiana's Physician-Patient Pri
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1973
48 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
prohibited from testifying as to overheard physician-patient com-
munications. For example, the knowledge which two ambulance
drivers gained while overhearing a physician-patient conversation
was held not privileged.5 3
Not all third persons are permitted to testify, however. For
example in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Deming4 two doctors were
partners in the practice of medicine, and one physician overheard a
discussion between his partner and a patient. Since the doctors were
partners, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the business of one
was that of the other, and the privilege applied to both men.15 In
North American Union v. Oleske8 it was necessary for the patient's
wife to tell the physician about her husband's symptoms; her hus-
band was unable to do so since he was unconscious at the time of
the physician's arrival. The wife's knowledge was held to be privi-
leged, since her disclosures were necessary for the intelligent com-
munication between physician and patient.57
Nurses and police officers deserve special attention in any dis-
cussion of third parties and the physician-patient privilege. In Indi-
ana the privilege does not extend to nurses who might overhear the
physician-patient communications. 8 The Indiana Court of Appeals
in General Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Co. v. Tibbs 9 stated:
The privilege does not extend to third persons who are pres-
ent and overhear a conversation under our decisions unless
such third person was necessary for the purpose of trans-
mitting the information to the physician 0
Although the plaintiff-patient argued that public policy requires
nurses to be included within the privilege, the court refused to ex-
pand the statute and cover such third persons. However, in the
53. Springer v. Byram, 137 Ind. 15, 36 N.E. 361 (1894). See also Mason's Union Life
Insurance Association v. Brockman, 26 Ind. App. 182, 59 N.E. 401 (1901) (patient in doctor's
office overhears conversation between physician and a patient; his knowledge held not privi-
leged).
54. 123 Ind. 384, 24 N.E. 86 (1890).
55. Id. at 390, 24 N.E. at 88.
56. 64 Ind. App. 435, 116 N.E. 68 (1917).
57. Id. at 444, 116 N.E. at 70.
58. See General Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Co. v. Tibbs, 102 Ind. App. 262, 2
N.E.2d 229 (1936).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 269, 2 N.E.2d at 232.
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recent case of Doss v. State"' the Indiana Supreme Court, in uphold-
ing the concept that third persons are not incompetent to testify,
said:
The patient-physician privilege . . . does not extend to
third persons who overhear conversations unless such per-
sons are necessary for the purpose of transmitting informa-
tion and aiding the physician.2
Except for the use of the conjunctive "and" in the above statement,
the emphasized segment provides hope for including nurses within
the protection of the privilege. The use of the conjunctive indicates
that the nurse's presence during the examination must be based on
more than mere aid to the physician; that is, she would have to be
present for the purpose of transmitting information as well. How-
ever, the nurse may often be used to transmit information. In a very
real sense, her assistance alone fosters communication between the
physician and his patient. For example, if the nurse draws a blood
sample, this increases the amount of information communicated to
the physician about the patient. In addition, the nurse is such a
familiar and necessary part of the medical profession that her pres-
ence normally would not inhibit the patient at all. Thus, there is
no reason to treat the nurse as a stranger to the physician-patient
relationship; she should be included within the privilege's protec-
tion.
Third party police officers are also outside the protection of the
privilege. In two recent cases a police officer's eligibility to testify
as a third person has been upheld. In both cases a patient was under
arrest for committing a felony, and the officer was present at the
hospital while a bullet was being removed from the suspect. In Doss
v. State"' the Supreme Court of Indiana emphasized that because
the patient-suspect was conscious, he waived his objection to the
officer's testimony at the trial by not objecting to the officer's pres-
ence in the operating room. In the case of Green v. State4 the
Supreme Court of Indiana held that a police officer has a right, if
not a duty, to be present in the operating room. In addition, the
Green court held that no breach of the physician-patient privilege
61. 256 Ind. 174, 267 N.E.2d 385 (1971).
62. Id. at 181, 267 N.E.2d at 390 (emphasis added).
63. 256 Ind. 174, 267 N.E.2d 385 (1971).
64. - Ind. -, 274 N.E.2d 267 (1971).
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occurred when the doctor handed the bullet to the officer who wit-
nessed its removal." The court further indicated that the evidence
already known by the police officer diminished the importance of
this physical evidence; the officer already knew of the bullet's exist-
ence prior to its removal, and the defendant had admitted the
crime.66 Furthermore, the court clearly indicated its attitude con-
cerning the use of the privilege in criminal cases:
We should keep in mind that the objective of the privi-
lege in such cases is namely to inspire full and complete
disclosure of knowledge pertinent and necessary to a trust-
ful and proper relationship in such cases. Where that objec-
tive is not served and the privilege is used to conceal the
commission of a crime, it has no social value and serves no
public purpose but in fact is turned into a shield to the
criminal and the commission of the crime.67
The quote states a compelling reason for allowing a police officer's
testimony to escape the prohibition of the privilege, and the fact
that the patient was a suspected criminal provides no reason for an
exception to the general rule that third persons can testify concern-
ing physician-patient communications.
A meaningful physician-patient relationship could not exist
under the facts in the Doss and Green cases. The officer's presence
in the examining room certainly inhibited each patient. However,
even if the officer was not present, the conditions were not appropri-
ate for the establishment of a free and open relationship between the
physician and the defendant-patient. The only result accomplished
by extending the privilege to cover third party police officers, there-
fore, would be concealment of evidence necesssary to establish crim-
inal guilt."'
Waiver by the Patient
The concept of waiver has become an important part of the
65. Id. at -, 274 N.E.2d at 272.
66. Id.
67. Id. at , 274 N.E.2d at 273.
68. It must be remembered that the physician was still prohibited from testifying. And
if the police officer attempted to testify as to what the injuries he observed indicated, this
testimony would be subject to objection, since a police officer is not competent to draw
conclusions from the type of wound he observed. Furthermore, he could not relate what the
physician told him for that would be objectionable as hearsay testimony.
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physician-patient privilege in Indiana." Since the privilege was cre-
ated for the patient's benefit, it has been held that only he can claim
or waive it."' Such waiver can be accomplished expressly by agreeing
that one's opposing counsel can discover any and all medical infor-
mation," or by not making a timely objection to privileged informa-
tion introduced at trial."
In contrast to these clear waivers, many cases have been con-
cerned with the more difficult question of implied waiver. The ma-
jority of these latter cases have treated implied waiver in three
areas. First, the privilege has been held to be impliedly waived in
medical malpractice cases. For example, in the 1891 case of Lane
v. Boicourt" the Indiana Supreme Court reasoned that when the
patient voluntarily published the occurrence by making it the basis
for his cause of action, he could not later assert the confidentiality
which the statute is designed to protect. 4 In Lane the physician was
charged with being negligent in his care and treatment of the plain-
tiff's wife during and after childbirth. The court ruled that it would
be very unfair to allow the wife and plaintiff to detail what hap-
pened and compel the physician to remain silent,75 especially since
oftentimes no other witnesses are available to provide the physi-
cian's intexpretation. Furthermore, in such a case there is a volun-
tary disclosure by the patient. So in fact there is no real reason to
allow the privilege to exist.
A second area dealing with implied waiver can be illustrated by
Baker v. Whittaker."6 In Baker the decedent-patient requested her
physician's presence for the sole purpose of determining whether she
was physically and mentally competent to execute a deed. In addi-
tion, third persons were present at the examination. Considering the
69. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Wiler, 100 Ind. 92 (1885).
70. See Masonic Mutual Benefit Association v. Beck, 77 Ind. 208 (1881); Penn Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Wiler, 100 Ind. 92 (1885).
71. See Bogen v. Krinn, 141 Ind. App. 418, 228 N.E.2d 426 (1967) (action for personal
injuries where plaintiff-patient signed a document which allowed discovery of "any and all
medical and psychological information concerning [himself]").
72. In re Beck's Estate, 143 Ind. App. 291, 240 N.E.2d 88 (1968); Studabaker v. Faylor,
52 Ind. App. 171, 98 N.E. 318 (1912).
73. 128 Ind. 420, 27 N.E. 1111 (1891).
74. Id. at 423, 27 N.E. at 1113. But see Aspy v. Botkins, 160 Ind. 170, 66 N.E. 462 (1902)
(court held information secured by physicians, other than defendant, after the treatment by
defendant-physician had ended was privileged).
75. 128 Ind. at 423, 27 N.E. at 1113.
76. 133 Ind. App. 347, 182 N.E.2d 442 (1962).
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presence of third persons and the express reason for the consulta-
tion, the Indiana appellate court held that if any confidential
relationship had existed, it was waived by the decedent himself."
The court ruled that it was a demonstration to all those present that
she possessed a sufficient mental competency to execute a deed."5
The decision seems correct, for the decedent utilized her physician-
patient relationship to broadcast to the world her competency. The
last thing she desired was confidentiality.
Finally, the privilege can be waived when the patient presents
his side of the medical story at trial. As in medical malpractice
cases, the patient-plaintiff cannot suppress damaging testimony by
invoking the protection of the privilege after presenting his interpre-
tation of the facts. The case of Northern Indiana Public Service Co.
v. McClure" involved a personal injury action in which a doctor
testified that the cause of the plaintiff-patient's injury was due to
carbon monoxide posioning. When the defense attempted to call
another physician who had also examined the plaintiff, the plaintiff
claimed that the information was privileged. The Indiana appellate
court held that the plaintiff had waived his right to object to the
defendant's medical evidence when the first physician's testimony
was introduced. 0 Similar facts existed in Schlarb v. Henderson,"1 an
action for personal injuries alleged to have resulted from the negli-
gent operation of an automobile. In Schlarb the plaintiff called two
physicians who advised and treated her after the accident. The
defendant then sought to introduce the testimony of a third doctor
who had participated with the two testifying physicians. The Indi-
ana Supreme Court admitted the testimony, holding that if the
details of the medical diagnosis and treatment were voluntarily dis-
closed and the injuries were relied upon as the basis of an action for
damages, the inquiry could not be limited to the version selected by
the plaintiff.82
77. Id. at 354, 182 N.E.2d at 446.
78. Id.
79. 108 Ind. App. 253, 24 N.E.2d 788 (1940).
80. Id. at 258, 24 N.E.2d at 790.
81. 211 Ind. 1, 4 N.E.2d 205 (1936). See also Lane v. Boicourt, 128 Ind. 420, 27 N.E.
1111 (1891).
82. 211 Ind. at 2, 4 N.E.2d at 206. But see Acme-Evans v. Schnepf, 214 Ind. 394, 14
N.E.2d 561 (1938), where the court, in a case on somewhat similar facts, held there was no
waiver involved by plaintiff-patient introducing the medical testimony of one of his physi-
cians. The court felt it could distinguish this case from Schlarb v. Henderson on the facts,
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As seen from the above two cases, the question of waiver in
personal injury cases is often crucial. Until recently the McClure
and Schlarb cases accurately stated the law in Indiana concerning
waiver in personal injury cases-waiver did not occur until the
plaintiff presented his own medical testimony at the trial. In 1971,
however, the case of Collins v. Blair 3 modified the law regarding
waiver in personal injury cases. In Collins the plaintiff introduced
the testimony of physicians who had treated him for injuries alleg-
edly sustained in an automobile accident. The defense attempted
to introduce the testimony of a doctor of chiropractic medicine to
prove that prior to the accident the plantiff had been treated for the
same condition allegedly caused by the defendant. Although the
plaintiff attempted to invoke the privilege, the Supreme Court of
Indiana stated:
Where a party-patient, of his own, does an act which will
require disclosure of a condition otherwise protected from
disclosure, there would appear to no longer be a basis upon
which to allow that party to selectively suppress relevant
medical evidence pertaining to the same specific condition.
By so holding we do not discount the concern of the Indiana
General Assembly that the confidential nature of the
physician-patient relationship be preserved at the cost of
rendering certain evidence inadmissible. Nevertheless, ac-
knowledgement of the privilege's continued existence in a
particular case can only be rationalized where such ac-
knowledgement serves to effectuate the purpose for which
the privilege was designed-the preservation of confidential
communications. Where a patient in effect elects to publish
the substance of these communications, the privilege's
objective can no longer be legitimately accomplished and
the privilege must be deemed waived. By holding other-
wise, we would fail to serve the policy underlying the
physician- patient privilege while coincidentally frustrating
the truth determining process.84
because the physician in question did not attend the plaintiff-patient at the time the other
doctors were and he had no relationship with the other doctors,
83. 259 Ind. 230, 268 N.E.2d 95 (1971). See also Harvey, Rules and Rulings for the Trial
Lawyer-Discovery-Doctor-Patient Privilege-Waiver, 15 Rrs.GsTAE 16 (1971). (Dean
Harvey hailed the Collins decision as unique and called it the leading case in the United
States on the subject.)
84. 259 Ind. at 237-38, 268 N.E.2d at 99 (emphasis by the court).
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Thus, the court held that the very filing of an action for per-
sonal injuries impliedly waived the privilege. The waiver occurred
when the party-patient voluntarily placed his medical condition in
issue by way of claim, counterclaim or affirmative answer."5 In so
doing, the party-patient waived the privilege as to all matters either
casually or historically related to the condition. 6 The effect of the
Collins case, therefore, is that in personal injury actions the plaintiff
can no longer utilize a doctor-patient privilege so far as discoverable
information is concerned.87 This is not to say that a "fishing expedi-
tion" can be made. If the opponent seeks information about matters
which are irrelevant to the condition placed in issue, a protective
order should be sought."' In addition the medical condition must be
voluntarily raised by the protected party-patient. The court left
little doubt that an opposing party could not raise a question as to
the physical or mental condition of the party-patient and therefore
force a waiver.55 The reasoning in Collins is sound; there is no pur-
pose for allowing the privilege to exist in personal injury actions as
to matters related to the physical condition placed in issue. The
patient cannot claim confidentiality when he is publicly announcing
his injuries.90
85. Id. For a discussion of when waiver is deemed to be triggered in other jurisdictions,
see Cosden, The Physician-Patient Privilege in Oklahoma, 7 TULSA L.J. 157 (1971) (Okla-
homa); Urborn, Medical Discovery in the Fifty States Plus Two, 33 INSUR. COUNS. J. 376
(1966) (general discussion and breakdown of the law in all of the states); Comment, Evidence:
Waiver of Physician-Patient Privilege, 51 MINN. L. REV. 575 (1967) (Alaska); Comment,
Recent Developments, Accelerated Waiver of the Physician-Patient Privilege, 42 WASH. L.
REv. 1107 (1967) (Washington).
86. 256 Ind. at 239, 66 N.E.2d at 101.
87. Harvey, supra note 83, at 16.
88. 256 Ind. at 242, 268 N.E.2d at 102.
89. Id. at 243, 268 N.E.2d at 103.
90. Two concepts tangentially related to waiver deserve mentioning. In Indiana, if the
physician was employed by the party-opponent of the patient, this has no bearing on whether
or not the privilege is deemed waived. See generally, Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. Gross,
186 Ind. 471, 114 N.E. 962 (1917); Chicago & E.R. Co. v. Schenkel, 57 Ind. App. 175, 104
N.E. 50 (1914); New York, Chicago & St. Louis R. Co. v. Mushrush, 11 Ind. App. 192, 37
N.E. 954 (1894). What is important is that the matters were communicated to the physician
in the course of the doctor discharging his professional obligation. Only in one case, Chicago,
I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Gorman, 47 Ind. App. 432, 94 N.E. 730 (1911), was the privileged relation-
ship deemed not to exist. This occurred because the physician involved never attempted to
treat the patient. He expressly told the patient that he was only there to gather information
for his employer. The doctor was acting in the capacity of investigator, not physician.
It is also clear that a waiver is not necessary for a hypothetical question to be asked of
the treating physician. In the case of Robertson v. State, - Ind, App. -, 291 N.E.2d
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Waiver After the Patient's Death
In Indiana the privilege does not terminate upon the patient's
death." It has been held to exist until one who stands in the place
of the deceased and whose interest is affected by the proposed dis-
closure waives the privilege.2 In several cases the courts have been
concerned with identifying such persons. Two groups of people ap-
pear to fit the definition. First, it is generally conceded that the
heirs may waive the privilege. 3 Second, the administrator or execu-
tor of the patient's estate has the power of waiver for the purpose of
conserving the interests of the estate. 4
A case which supports these general rules is Stayner v. Nye.9"
In this case an action was brought to set aside a deed executed by
the decedent-patient on the grounds that the execution was pro-
cured through fraud and undue influence. The plaintiffs were the
grantor's only surviving heirs, while the defendant-grantees were of
no blood relation to the deceased. In the course of proving undue
influence, the plaintiffs offered the testimony of two physicians who
had treated the decedent. Each was questioned regarding the dece-
dent's physical and mental condition at the time treatment was
708 (1973), the defendant-patient was charged with driving an automobile while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. Prior to the physician's appearance on the stand, rather
overwhelming evidence was presented. Two state troopers testified that the defendant had
run into the back of their squad car; they gave the defendant a breathalizer test, and the
results of the test indicated that the defendant was intoxicated. They also testified as to his
apperance, speech and general demeanor. The physician who had treated the defendant at
the hospital was then called to the stand. He was asked a hypothetical question based on
the evidence already in the record as to whether, in his opinion, one displaying such charac-
teristics would be considered intoxicated. Predictably, the defense raised the objection of
privileged communications. The court overruled the objection stating that just because the
expert witness happened to be a treating physician did not make him incompetent. He was
not testifying as to matters communicated to him in his professional capacity, but only from
the facts already proven. However, if the privilege is to remain inviolate, the better choice
would be to require the use of another expert to comment upon the facts already in evidence,
and not one whose opinion could be tainted by previous knowledge.
91. See generally Note, Physician-Patient Privilege-Waiver in Deed and Will
Contests, 23 IND. L.J. 295 (1948).
92. Masonic Mutual Benefit Ass'n v. Beck, 77 Ind. 203, 209 (1881).
93. Stayner v. Nye, 227 Ind. 231, 85 N.E.2d 496 (1949); Studabaker v. Faylor, 52 Ind.
App. 171, 98 N.E. 318 (1912).
94. Heaston v. Kreig, 167 Ind. 101, 77 N.E. 805 (1906); Morris v. Morris, 119 Ind. 341,
21 N.E. 918 (1889); Vaughn v. Martin, 145 Ind. App. 455, 251 N.E.2d 444 (1969); Sager v.
Moltz, 80 Ind. App. 122, 139 N.E. 687 (1923); Studabaker v. Faylor, 52 Ind. App. 171,98 N.E.
318 (1912).
95. 227 Ind. 231, 85 N.E.2d 496 (1949).
96. Id. at 240, 85 N.E.2d at 500.
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administered. The plaintiffs and the administrator of the estate
expressly waived the privilege as to the doctors, and the defendants
objected to the waiver. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the
physicians' testimony was properly admitted.96 Following the logic
of Wigmore,17 the court stated that as the personal representative
of the deceased, the administrator had an interest even though the
litigation involved real estate which the deceased had transferred
prior to his death."8 His interest was represented by the concern
which an administrator has for satisfying the debts of and claims
against the estate. Thus, if the estate's personal property were not
sufficient to pay the claims, then the real estate, if brought back
into the estate, would make up the deficiency. Further, the children
of the deceased were presumed to have a greater interest in protect-
ing the memory of their father than the defendants, who were
strangers in blood to the decedent. Since the people who have the
natural desire to protect the decedent were willing to expose privi-
leged communications, there was no reason to allow strangers to
close the door to the ascertainment of facts relevant to the adjudica-
tion. To hold otherwise would encourage fraud in similar instances,
for strangers could claim the privilege and prohibit the use of the
best available evidence concerning the mental competency of per-
sons who are easily subjected to fraudulent schemes.9 0°
The general rule that administrators and heirs can waive the
privilege does not exist without exception. For example, an adminis-
97. 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 2391 (McNaughton ed. 1961). Wigmore
states:
The personal representative of the deceased may waive the privilege. One who
is entrusted with the management of the deceased's property may surely be trusted
to protect the memory and reputation of the deceased in so far as it is liable to injury
by the disclosure of his physical condition when alive. It is incongruous to hold that
the person who manages the litigation of the deceased's property interests has no
power to waive rules of evidence for the purpose of advancing those interests. The
power of an heir may also be conceded if we remember that the heir, first, is at least
equally interested in preserving the ancestor's reputation, and second, has an equal
moral claim to protect the deceased's property rights from unwarranted diminution.
The futility, under the circumstances, of predicating any privilege is more apparent
when (as in the usual case) the issue turns upon the fact of a testator's sanity, which
is so bruited publicly in the litigation that the pretense of preserving secrecy is a vain
one.
Id. at 856.
98. 227 Ind. at 240, 85 N.E.2d at 500.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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trator cannot waive the privilege in order to protect his own personal
position."" Rather, he can waive it only to protect or conserve the
interests of the estate, and justifying his actions as administrator
does not qualify as concerning the interests of the estate."°2 Likewise,
heirs cannot always waive the privilege. In Towles v. McCurdy0 3 the
controversy concerned the heirs-at-law and devisees under a will;
children of the deceased were present in each group. The heirs ob-
jected to probating of the will, claiming that it was procured
through undue influence and that it was not properly executed. The
Indiana Supreme Court held that in such a controversy the heirs or
devisees who attempted to avoid the will could not, for their own
benefit, waive the objections to the physician's testimony. 04 The
court said that the decision was based upon "obvious reasons,''", 5
although the reasons were not explained. One can only speculate
that the court was confused as to which party would protect the
interests of the deceased. Since here both parties were presumed to
have a natural interest in protecting the deceased's reputation and
property," the court could not decide whose desires should be fa-
vored. Thus, the course most advantageous to the deceased was to
disallow the waiver.
It is doubtful that the Towles court made the proper decision.
The question of mental condition was relevant to the issues raised.
In terms of training and experience, the physician's knowledge
would be very reliable. However, the greatest single argument
against the court's ruling in Towles is that the true purpose of the
statute was not considered. The main concern of the privilege in
Indiana is the preservation of confidential communications which
the patient does not want disclosed. 07 This concern over the pa-
101. Scott v. Smith, 171 Ind. 453, 85 N.E. 774 (1908).
102. Id. at 457, 85 N.E. at 775. Although the main thrust of this section of the article
is not concerned with the inconsistencies within the concept of waiver after the patient's
death, the administrator's plight is worth noting. The administrator should be able to waive
the privilege in order to show that the estate did in fact owe a debt to a particular person
and that his payment of the debt was correct. It is difficult to imagine what purpose is being
served by placing the administrator in the precarious position of having to satisfy legitimate
claims and obligations which the estate owes, and at the same time, not allowing him to waive
the privilege to establish the authenticity of the obligations.
103. 163 Ind. 12, 71 N.E. 129 (1904).
104. Id. at 15, 71 N.E. at 130.
105. Id. See also Note, Physician-Patient Privilege- Waiver in Deed and Will Contests,
23 IND. l.J. 295, 296 (1948).
106. 163 Ind. at 15, 71 N.E. at 130.
107. Collins v. Blair, 256 Ind. 230, 238, 286 N.E.2d 95, 99 (1971).
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tient's desires is designed to encourage him to discuss embarrassing
matters that may be necessary for proper medical treatment. Thus,
the privilege seeks to assure the patient that his statements will be
kept confidential unless he desires otherwise. While he is alive, it is
necessary to maintain the patient's trust and confidence in order to
assure a free and uninhibited relationship. After his death, however,
the patient can no longer be embarrassed by the physician's testi-
mony. In fact, the cases demonstrate that holding the physician's
knowledge privileged after the patient's death results in the sup-
pression of the best or only evidence as to the existence of fraud,08
undue influence'09 and mental incompetence.10
Therefore, if the privilege were held to terminate upon the pa-
tient's death, such unlawful activity would not go unnoticed, be-
cause freer discovery of relevant information would be allowed. This
would be accomplished without damaging the confidential commu-
nications which promote an uninhibited relationship between the
physician and his patient.
CONCLUSION
As far as discovery of relevant information for litigation is con-
cerned, the physician-patient privilege is undesirable. It may pro-
mote free discussion between the doctor and his patient, but it
inhibits the court's search for facts on which to base its decisions.
The courts are forced to work with this hindrance. It is the legisla-
ture's role to determine social policy priorities, and they have
deemed that the physician-patient relationship in some instances is
more important than the discovery of information.
What the courts should not accept is that the statute be ex-
panded beyond its natural boundaries. The performance of the Indi-
ana courts has been admirable in some areas. An example is the case
of Collins v. Blair,"' the decision in which the Indiana Supreme
Court abrogates the privilege in personal injury actions. However,
the courts have failed in the area of allowing the privilege to reach
108. See generally Aetna Insurance Co. v. Deming, 123 Ind. 384, 24 N.E. 86 (1890);
Excelsior Mutual Aid Association of Anderson, Indiana v. Riddle, 91 Ind. 84 (1883).
109. See generally McCord v. Strader, 82 N.E.2d 893 (Ind. 1948), aff'd on other grounds,
227 Ind. 389, 86 N.E.2d 441 (1949); Vaughn v. Martin, 145 Ind. App. 455, 251 N.E.2d 444
(1969).
110. See generally Stayner v. Nye, 227 Ind. 231, 85 N.E.2d 496 (1949); Studabaker v.
Faylor, 52 Ind. App. 171, 98 N.E. 318 (1912).
111. 256 Ind. 230, 268 N.E.2d 95 (1971).
[Vol. 8Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 [1973], Art. 2
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beyond the life of the patient."' Fortunately, the trend of Indiana
cases has been to limit the statutory privilege. This is also the trend
of most recent enactments."' It is suggested that the best route for
the Indiana courts to follow would be to continue to limit the statute
as much as possible and to hold that the privilege no longer exists
after the patient's death.
112. Towles v. McCurdy, 163 Ind. 12, 71 N.E. 129 (1904) (heirs brought suit against
devisees of will, held privilege could not be waived); Mathews v. Rex Health and Accident
Insurance Co., 86 Ind. App. 335, 157 N.E. 467 (1927) (holding that information gained by
pathologist during an autopsy was privileged).
113. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 105, (Cleary ed. 1972) at 227-28.
McCormick suggests the best alternative would be to abolish the privilege entirely. See also
Note, Hearsay-Admissibility of Hospital Records, 41 N.C. L. REv. 621 (1963). This note
discusses and criticizes one court's ruling using the North Carolina privilege statute which
allows the judge to compel disclosure when, in the court's opinion, disclosure is necessary for
the administration of justice. But see WISCONSIN RU.FS OF EVIDENCE, Rule 805.04 in 46 Wis.
BAR BIT[.I. 57, 63 (1973), newly enacted rules of evidence that provide for the general
physician-patient privilege, with the following situations not being privileged: communica-
tions relevant to hospitalizing a patient for mental illness; when the examination is ordered
by a judge; as to a condition which is an element of a claim or defense; when facts are related
directly to the facts or immediate circumstances of a homicide or the information is about
an abused or injured child who is a suspected victim of child abuse.
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